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THE JURISDICTIONAL FACT DOCTRINE IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA - A MITIGATING PLEA
By DAvID MULLAN*

In a recent article in the Osgoode Hall Law Journal,' Professor P. W.
Hogg criticized the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Bell v.
Ontario Human Rights Commission.2 Principally his criticisms were threefold.

First, he disapproved of the wide view the Court took of its powers to review
decisions for jurisdictional error. Secondly, he took issue with the Court's
finding that the accommodation in question was not a "self-contained dwelling unit".3 Finally, he rejected the Court's decision to inquire into the merits
of the case in favour of the decision of 'the Ontario Court of Appeal 4 that
review was untimely until the board of inquiry had had an opportunity of
determining the jurisdictional question.
On the question whether the accommodation came within the Act, I
accept Professor Hogg's analysis and agree with him that the Supreme Court
was wrong at this point. However, with respect to the issues of the authority
of the Court to review for jurisdictional fact and the timeliness of judicial
review, there are certain points at which I find Professor Hogg's conclusions
difficult to accept.
The general basis upon which the courts define their power to review
decisions for jurisdictional error is that in the conferring of statutory powers
the legislature attributes tentative decision-making authority to the statutory
decision-maker with respect to some issues and final decision-making authority with respect to other issues. Those over which the decision-maker has
only tentative authority are issues affecting his jurisdiction. Those over which
he has final authority are those within his jurisdiction and are not generally
subject to review.5 The principal difficulty in classifying various stages of the
decision-making process into one of these two categories is caused by the fact
that the legislature seldom, if ever, indicates which issues it considers jurisdictional and which it considers to be intra-jurisdictional.
*Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University.
I P. Hogg, The lurisdictional Fact Doctrine in the Supreme Court of Canada

(1971), 9 O.H.LJ. 203. Further comment on Bell from another perspective is contained
in Ian A. Hunter, ludicial Review of Human Rights Legislation: McKay v. Bell (1972),

7 U.B.C.L.R. 17.
2 [1971] S.C.R. 756; (1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
3 Under The Ontario Human Rights Code certain discriminatory practices in relation to the occupancy of "self-contained dwelling units" are forbidden. See R.S.O.
1970, c. 318, section 3.
4
Sub nom. R. v. TarnopoIsky; Exparte Bell, [1970] 2 O.R. 672; (1969), 11 D.L.R.
(3d) 658. The unanimous judgment of a five man Court of Appeal was delivered by
Laskin J.A.

GSee a recent statement of this proposition in the judgment of Lord Wilberforce
in Anisminik Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147 at 207.
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The conclusion Professor Hogg derives from such a failure on the part
of the legislature is that the legislature therefore intended all questions to be
determined exclusively by the decision-maker and that he should not be
subject to judicial scrutiny for any form of preliminary or collateral jurisdictional error. 6 Thus, in relation to Bell's case, the question of whether the
accommodation was self-contained becomes a matter exclusively for the
Ontario Human Rights Commission and the Board of Inquiry appointed
under the Act, 7 since the courts are given no specific role in relation to this
issue by the Act. This, of course, is not the view the courts have taken of
their role in relation to jurisdictional error and Professor Hogg acknowledges
that it is now too late for the courts to deny their authority to review for
jurisdictional error.8 Indeed, whatever may have been the position initially,
even legislatures have both impliedly and explicitly acknowledged the role
of the courts in relation to jurisdictional error. Continued legislative inactivity
in the face of court assumption of power to review for jurisdictional error
must be taken to provide some indication of legislative acquiescence in the
system. This is particularly so when legislatures presumably have authority
to include privative clauses in legislation specifically denying the courts review
power for jurisdictional error. Instead legislatures have seldom gone beyond
standard types of privative clause despite persistent judicial holding that these
do not affect review for jurisdictional error. 9 In recent months this implicit
legislative acceptance of the system has been given more specific acknowledgement in relation to statutory decision-makers both in Ontario and at the
federal level. The Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971 of Ontario,' 0 which
creates a new judicial review remedy in this province, continues all the
grounds for review presently available at common law while by virtue of the
Federal Court Act, the Federal Court of Appeal is specifically given authority
to review for jurisdictional error."
Aside from legislative acceptance of the jurisdictional issue basis for
judicial review, it can be questioned whether an alternative to such a system
was ever open to the courts. Professor Hogg is full of admiration for the
6 Supra, note 1 at 210 and ff.
7 The Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318, particularly sections 13
and 14.
8 Supra, note 1 at 216.
9 One Ontario example of such a privative clause is section 9(5) of the National
Selective Service Mobilization Regulations, P.C. 10924 ([1942] C.W.O.R. 573) which
was in issue in the case of R. ex rel Sewell v. Morrell, [1944] 3 D.L.R. 710 (Ontario
H.C.). This specifically excluded jurisdictional error from the ambit of judicial review
and was given effect to by the court in that case. Such examples are, however, rare.
See also R. v. Commissioner of Police for The Northern Territory; Ex parte Holroyd
(1965), 7 Fed. L.R. 8 (Supreme Court of the Northern Territory) and the recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Pringle and Department of Manpower and Immigrationv. Fraser (1972), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 28 and Woodward Estate v. Minister of Justice
(1972), 27 D.L.R. (3d) 608.
1o S.O. 1971, c. 48. See section 2.
"1Section 28, S.C. 1970-72, c. 1. Jurisdictional error is also legislatively recognized
in a number of sections creating statutory rights of appeal to the courts from decisions
of administrative tribunals. See e.g. section 26(1) of the Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c. B-11, as amennded by section 64(3) of the Federal Court Act, S.C. 1970-72, c. 1.
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writings of D. M. Gordon, Q.C.12 who for many years has been exposing
the frailities of the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine. Yet, the writings of Gordon
are equally open to criticism and do not really offer a solution to the problem.
In his 1929 Law Quarterly Review article, Gordon reveals himself as a supporter of the "pure" theory of jurisdiction.1 3 De Smith gives a definition of
the pure theory of jurisdiction:
Jurisdiction means authority to decide. Whenever a judicial tribunal is empowered
or required to inquire into a question of law or fact for the purpose of giving a
decision on it, its findings thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on an
application for certiorari but are binding till reversed on appeal. 14
The principal element in this definition is "authority to decide" or, as Lord
Reid has recently described it, "entitle[ment] to enter on the inquiry in
question."' 5 If this authority or entitlement does not exist, the tribunal is
without jurisdiction and its decisions stand liable to be quashed.
In contrast to this pure theory are the wider theories of jurisdiction.
The basis on which these theories operate is stated by de Smith in the following terms:...it must not be assumed that when Parliament empowers an inferior tribunal
to inquire into certain facts it intends that the tribunal's conclusions on every one
of those facts shall be unimpeachable.16
Accordingly there are certain questions, which while under the "pure" theory
of jurisdiction do not go to the tribunal's authority to decide the matter, are
of such importance that they are described as jurisdictional. In the recent
House of Lord's decision in Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission, Lord Reid catalogued these errors which in his terms render a decision
a nullity. Beside collateral or preliminary questions affecting jurisdiction he
also listed the following:
It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which
it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the inquiry to
comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith
have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal
with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was
required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter
which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account.17
l2 Supra, note 1 at 210-211. Gordon's contributions to this debate are listed in
footnote 26 of Professor Hogg's article. A more recent contribution is What Did the
Anisminic Case Decide? (1971), 34 Mod L Rev. 1. Indeed, though Mr. Gordon is
critical of the result reached in that case, his general attitude towards issues of jurisdiction appears to have mellowed somewhat as indicated by the following extract:
The majority law lords, up to a point, take a very orthodox view of what amounts
to excess of jurisdiction, a view that no one could quarrel with. They say that
jurisdiction is a matter of field or area of cognisance and of course excess of
jurisdiction will be going outside that field or orea (Id. at 6).
13D. M. Gordon, The Relation of Facts to Jurisdiction (1929), 45 L.Q.R. 459.
14 S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (London: Stevens, 2nd
ed., 1968) 96.
15

InAnisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, supra, note 5 at 171.
10 Supra, note 14 at 97-98.
17 Supra, note 5.
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Lord8 Reid concluded by saying that this list was not intended to be exhaustive1 but, even so, on their face they initially seem to indicate a much broader
range of jurisdictional errors than that covered by the "pure" theory of
jurisdiction.
Gordon, in espousing the "pure" theory of jurisdiction as opposed to
the wider theories, takes the example of an assault charge.
If, therefore, an adjudication has been made by any tribunal that an assault within
the statute mentioned has been committed, it is idle, so far as jurisdiction is concerned, to inquire whether the assault actually was committed; the only relevant
question is, Was the tribunal that so found the tribunal whose opinion was made
the test?19

In other words, a reviewing court may inquire as to whether the tribunal concerned had jurisdiction in matters of assault but may go no further. How
much scope does this afford the courts? Presumably it allows the court to
decide whether this is a tribunal which has any jurisdiction at all in relation
to assault. It would also seem to allow a reviewing court to decide whether
the particular charge comes within the territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal20
and also whether the person charged with assault is a person amenable to
the tribunal's jurisdiction. All these questions would seem to be elements in
the issue whether this was "the tribunal whose opinion was made the test."
Translating this example into terms of Bell's case, is there any essential
difference between the issue of whether accommodation is a "self-contained
dwelling unit" and that of whether this is a tribunal which has jurisdiction
over charges of assault? Certainly, issues of the kind raised by the assault
example are seldom litigated. The tribunal normally will assume jurisdiction
without question. Nevertheless, if the tribunal's competence in relation to the
subject matter of assault is put into issue, it will be forced to make a preliminary determination of law and fact before proceeding, a determination
which is essentially the same as that in issue in Bell. For Professor Hogg the
beauty of Gordon's theory rests in the notion that once a tribunal has power
to decide an issue it has jurisdiction to decide that issue conclusively either
way without court intervention. Yet Gordon himself destroys the symmetry
of that theory by admitting of some scope for jurisdictional inquiries by a
court, the subject matter of which may have already been the subject of a
preliminary determination by the tribunal under challenge. Once some kind
of jurisdictional review by the courts is accepted then the whole question of
how far that inquiry should extend comes into focus and in terms of his own
criticisms Gordon becomes involved in the problem of delineating questions
affecting jurisdiction from those which do not. Indeed, the "pure" theory of
jurisdiction rather than being "an uncompromising rejection of the jurisdictional fact doctrine '2 1 is a theory which states that the courts can review for
"very" preliminary or collateral matters as opposed to the normal position
Is Id.
19 Supra, note 13 at 461-62.
20
e.g. R. v. Dowling (1889), 17 O.R. 698. See however Gordon's views on this
point. Supra, note 13 at 484-488.
21
Supra, note 1 at 210.
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that all preliminary
or collateral matters are subject to review and there is
"no acid test"'22 for distinguishing what are "very" preliminary questions from
preliminary questions.
Basically the problem is that even Gordon, despite his rejection of the
wider theories of jurisdiction is not completely prepared to acknowledge a
tribunal's authority to err at will and to function in complete disregard of
empowering legislation. So he admits of exceptions and by opening the door
to jurisdictional error even minutely he raises all the problems of the jurisdictional theory. It is not clear whether Professor Hogg agrees with Gordon
in this matter and it may well be that Professor Hogg completely rejects any
notion of preliminary or collateral jurisdictional error and in doing so goes
further even than Gordon. However, the notion that a tribunal or any statutory decision-maker may do anything to the limits of enforcement authority
is difficult to accept completely and impossible to justify historically, save in
relation to the highest court in the land.
The growth of statutory decision-making powers and the movement
towards specialist tribunals rather than courts as decision-making agencies
was not accompanied by the creation of a coherent system of appeals. TraditionaUy the superior courts of the land were at common law responsible for
supervising the affairs of inferior tribunals on the basis of such matters as
jurisdiction. 23 Given this state of affairs and given the early criticisms levelled
at decision-making through tribunals rather than the ordinary courts, 24 it is
difficult to argue that legislatures generally intended such decision-making
processes to be immune from judicial review on the basis of jurisdictional
error. Rather, the courts' historical position as protectors of the citizenry
from excesses of executive power and the perceived need for confining statutory decision-makers within the limit of their powers dictated the continuation of review for jurisdictional error. Moreover, the existence of these
traditional review powers militated against the need for a system of appeals
to be worked out in the context of individual statutory powers.
Beyond questions of legislative intention, review for jurisdictional error
can be justified on a more basic level yet. Notions of the Rule of Law and
22

Professor Hogg adopts this expression from H.W.R. Wade, Anglo-American
Administrative Law: More Reflections (1966), 82 LQ.R. 226, 231 (Id., at 211).
23 For illuminating accounts of the development of the common law of judicial
review in England see Edith Henderson, Foundations of English Administrative Law:
Certiorariand Mandamus in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1963); Amnon Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1965) and Louis L Jaffe, Judidal Control of Administrative Action (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1965) at 624-633. For a time, as pointed out by both Jaffe (Id. at
630-631) and de Smith (Supra, note 14 at 96- 99), the English courts appear to have
adopted the pure theory of jurisdiction but this was contrary to earlier authority and
was eventually abandoned.
24
See e.g. Gordon Hewart, The New Despotism (London: E. Benn, 1929) and
the Donoughmore Committee's Report (Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers,
Cmnd. 4060 (1932)). The Donoughmore Committee was set up in 1929, partly in
response to Lord Hewart's criticism in his book of the growth of administrative power
in England.
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the position of the courts in constitutional history25 point to the desirability of
providing a method by which statutory authorities can be confined within
the limits of their statutory mandate. As yet our legal system has not reached
the degree of sophistication or anarchy (depending on your legal philosophy) 26 which permits statutory authorities to unilaterally determine which
statutory directions they will obey and which they will not. Legislative supremacy still dictates that power must be exercised within the scope of statutory

authority and, in the absence of alternative methods, the common law of
judicial review developed by the courts remains a necessary safeguard in ensuring adherence to this basic principle.
Times have, however, changed. First, the functions exercised by statutory decision-makers are so many and varied nowadays that it is not possible
to accommodate them all within the single system of judicial supervision
developed by the common law. Secondly, the concept of jurisdiction has
burgeoned to such an extent that the courts have now reached the stage where
virtually any error can be classified as jurisdictional should the courts so
27
desire. The Lord Reid formula from Anisiminic is ample evidence of this.
Because of this the old methods have outlived their usefulness. In a relatively
unsophisticated system of statutory power they were most useful. Today they
are inadequate.

What are the solutions? Unilateral abandonment by the courts of the
jurisdiction doctrine never was and never could be the solution. Too much
legislative action has been predicated in reliance on it. Moreover, in terms of
current jurisprudence it would only switch emphasis from jurisdictional error
to abuse of discretion as a ground for judicial review, a change of no real
effect since, in recent years, the right to review for jurisdictional error has
25
The role of the superior courts of Canada as supervisors of the actions of inferior
courts, tribunals and statutory decision-makers is implicitly recognized in the preamble
to the British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Vict., c. 3 which creates in Canada a
"constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom". This notion is
further augmented by section 129 of the B.N.A. Act, which specifically preserves the
pre-Confederation jurisdiction of provincial superior courts and, also, by the arguments
that the B.N.A. Act guarantees the "jurisdiction of provincial superior courts respecting
interpretation and application of laws within s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act'. See W. R.
Lederman, The Independence of the Judiciary (Part 2) (1956), 34 Can. Bar Rev. 1139
at 1166 and generally at 1166-1175.
26The notion that all laws need not be obeyed is probably most clearly developed
in the area of selective enforcement of criminal statutes. For a recent discussion of
prosecutorial discretion and the problems involved in the decisions of enforcement
agencies not to prosecute for certain breaches of the law see Chapter 6 of K. C. Davis,
Discretionary Justice (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969).
27
Supra, note 13. Such is the scope for review afforded by this list that it seems
to make any error at all potentially classifiable as jurisdictional. See Gordon, What Did
Anisminic Decide? (Supra, note 12 at 7) and H. W. R. Wade, Constitutional and
Administrative Aspects of the Anisminic Case (1969), 85 L.Q.R. 198, 211. This wide
definition of jurisdictional error was also accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, [1970]

S.C.R. 425 at 435-436; (1970), 11 D.L.R. (3d) 336 at 344-345, discussed by Professor
Hogg (at 211-213).
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subsumed review powers for abuse of discretion anyway. 28 Professor Hogg
states that the right to review for abuse of discretion "insists upon a measure
of deference to the agency" 29 and "requires serious error"3 0 yet, where there
can be an abuse of discretion for failure to take account of relevant factors
or taking account of irrelevant factors, the measure of control attributed to
the courts is considerable. Judicial judgment of what constitute relevant and
irrelevant factors allows for a wide degree of interference in the merits of
tribunal decisions.
Indeed, the only feasible solution is for the legislature to work out the
proper scope, if any, for court intervention within the context of particular
empowering statutes. In particular, an attempt should be made to amalgamate
appeal and review powers and to specifically clarify in the context of that
amalgamation which matters should be subject to judicial scrutiny and which
should not. In other words, matters affecting jurisdiction should be specifically defined or, alternatively, (depending on the nature of the statutory
authority) all errors of law should be subject to attack. This mammoth task
has generally been eschewed by the legislatures of Canada which currently
seem prepared to acquiesce in present systems of judicial review. The message of the McRuer Commission Report,3 ' the remedial reforms in Ontario 32
28

See for example the grounds for review for abuse of discretion listed in the

House of Lords' decision of Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food,
[1968] A.C. 997 per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest at 1040-1041. These are virtually
identical to the grounds for review for jurisdictional error listed by Lord Reid in
Anisminic. This point is developed in J. S. Smillie, Judicial Review of Abuse of Discretionary Power (1969), 47 Can. Bar Rev. 623.
29 Supra, note 1 at 216.
80 Id.
8
1See Inquiry into Civil 'Rights, Report No. 1, Volume I (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1968) 308 and ff., where the Royal Commission recommends extensions of the
scope of judicial review of administrative action, extensions substantially accepted in
The Judicial Review Procedure Act, S.O. 1971, c. 48.
3
2 The Judicial Review Procedure Act, S.O. 1971, c. 48 creates a new comprehensive remedy of judicial review which extends to all errors of law on the face of the
record, irrespective of whether the tribunal concerned is judicial or administrative,
and also to allfindings of fact unsupported by evidence, when the tribunal concerned
is obliged to base its findings on evidence presented or on the basis of facts of which
it is entitled to take notice (see section 2(2) and (3) ). This is in contrast to the generally accepted common law position whereby non-jurisdictional error of law was only
reviewable by certiorari if it appeared on the face of the record of a tribunal obliged
to act judicially (see Re Ontario Labour Relations Board, Bradley v. Canadian
General Electric Co., E1957] O.R. 316, 8 D.L.R. (2d.) 65 (Ont. CA.) and a
complete absence of evidence in a matter within jurisdictiion was not subject to
review at all (see R. v. Nat Bell Liquors, [1922] 2 A.C. 128). In addition to
establishing this new comprehensive remedy which increases the scope of judicial review, the new Act also fails to make any attempt to amalgamate review and appeal
rights. This new remedy is available "notwithstanding any right of appeal" (section
2(1) ) so that where appeal rights and review rights are available for the same error
the aggrieved person may invoke either remedy and where the appeal right does not
cover the error alleged it may be challenged under the Act notwithstanding the fact that
the legislature in specifically directing its mind to an individual tribunal has seen fit not

to create an appeal right in respect of that particular kind of error.
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and the Federal Court Act33 is very largely the message of increased judicial
protection of citizens' rights against agency action. Legislative intention, if
anything, points towards maintenance of current modes of review - indeed,
a possible increase. Accordingly, Professor Hogg's plea for judicial selfrestraint is to a great measure counter to the general tenor of legislative
activity in this area. The search for legislative intention, which Professor
Hogg ardently espouses, leads to the conclusion, whatever its merits, that
legislatures are countenancing increased judicial activity.
Given such a legislative policy, how should the courts react to arguments
based on judicial self-restraint? Efficiency, expertise and costs may all point
in the direction of conclusive tribunal determination of particular issues, yet
legislative intention seemingly leads in the opposite direction. Accordingly,
the criticism, if any, of judicial intervention in the Bell case should rest not
so much with the Supreme Court of Canada as with the legislatures of this
country. They have basically given up on the issue of trying to tailor the
proper scope of judicial intervention to the needs of particular decisionmakers.3 4 Indeed, the legislation in question in Bell does not even make a
token effort at restricting judicial review by the inclusion of a standard privative clause.
Even allowing for the argument that weight should be given to an expert
tribunal's finding in relation to issues, be they jurisdictional or not, this has
diminished relevance in relation to the Ontario Human Rights Code. In
Bell's case, the Ontario Human Rights Commission apparently did not consider the issue of the status of Bell's accommodation prior to referring the
matter to a board of inquiry under S. 4 (1) of the Act.3 5 Moreover, the
board of inquiry as an ad hoc body appointed to deal with matters only on
a single case basis,3 6 arguably is in a worse position to interpret the application of the Code than is a reviewing court. At least a reviewing court will
presumably have some experience in questions of statutory interpretation,
s3 In the case of tribunals obliged to act judicially, the Federal Court Act, S.C.
1970-82, c. 1, section 28 provides that the Federal Court of Appeal may review for
all errors of law and also factual errors made in a perverse or capricious manner
without regard to the evidence. Once again it can be argued that this constitutes an
increase in the common law scope of judicial review. Additionally, while the Federal
Court cannot intervene by way of judicial review where a ground for a statutory right
of appeal exists, to the extent that statutory appeal rights do not cover rights of
review available under the Act, a remedy by way of review may still be sought (section
29). Here too the grounds for judicial intervention have been made the same irrespective of the character of the particular decision-maker and regardless of the limits
the legislature chose to impose on judicial intervention when creating appeal rights with
respect to particular decision-making powers.
34The notion that the scope of judicial intervention in statutory decision-making
should be individualized within the context of empowering statutes to meet the particular needs of varying types of decision-making processes is one advocated by Professor

John Willis, in The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values (1968),
U. of T. L. 351 at 359 - "The principle of 'uniqueness' is the principle for me".
35

Previously section 13(1), S.O. 1961-62, c. 93.
section 14 (1), the Minister of Labour on the recommendation of the
Human Rights Commission appoints a board of inquiry each time the Commission is
36Under

unable to effect a settlement of the matter complained of.
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something which may not be possessed by a Board of Inquiry by virtue of the
fact that there is no requirement for legal representation on the Board. In
practice, of course, as Professor Hogg points out, there is in fact normally a
lawyer on the Board37 and this perhaps lessens somewhat the weight of the
above argument. However, to the extent that Professor Hogg criticizes the
attitudes of Stewart J.38 towards human rights in this case, it is also possible
to point to Dean Tarnopolsky's record as a champion of human rights in
this country. In terms of neutrality there is an argument against either Stewart
J. or Dean Tarnopolsky deciding this issue finally. Certainly, with an Act
forwarding the cause of human rights it may be highly desirable to have
known champions of human rights sitting on boards of inquiry, but in terms
of ensuring that such boards function within proper statutory limits there is
an argument for some degree of judicial supervision, which hopefully would
be more depoliticized than the type of judgment delivered by Stewart J.
This part of the discussion brings into focus the whole question of timeliness. Even accepting the jurisdiction theory as a basis for judicial review,
there is considerable merit in Professor Hogg's argument that the courts
should generally not intervene until such time as the tribunal has had an
opportunity to make a preliminary determination of the matter. In terms of
time and cost, Bell should normally have given the Board of Inquiry the
chance of looking at the matter before commencing on a path of judicial
review. A preliminary decision would also have given the courts something
from which to articulate more convincingly their decision to review. However, in the context of the particular dispute in Bell's case, it is significant
that a Board headed by Dean Tarnopolsky had in the case of Mitchell v.
O'Brien in 1968 decided that accommodation of the kind offered by Bell
came within the ambit of the Act.89 Similarly, in 1969 another Board of
Inquiry in Duncan v. Szoldatits4 ° had reached the conclusion that accommodation of a less self-contained nature than that in issue in Bell came within
the Act. Though, of course, rules of stare decisis are not applicable in these
circumstances, the matter at issue was virtually predetermined against Bell
at the Board level and in the circumstances an initial determination by the
Board would have been of dubious use and would involve unnecessary expenditure of money and time. Judicial settlement had become an obvious
necessity prior to the Board hearing and it is not really correct to say that
the court had insufficient factual information to determine the issue. The
fact that Bell's affidavit as to the nature of the premises went unanswered by
87

Supra, note 1 at 207, note 16.
38 Id., at 206. Stewart J. delivered the judgment of the Ontario High Court in this
case ([1969] 2 O.R. 709 and 6 D.L.R. (3d) 576) and in the course of that judgment
criticized the content of The Ontario Human Rights Code (at 718 and 585 respectively).
89 See Report of the Board of Inquiry of Tarnopolsky on the complaint of Miss
Mitchell, July 1968.
40 See Report of the Board of Inquiry of Krever on the complaint of Duncan,
January 1969. Here the accommodation in issue included not only a shared entrance hall
(as in Bell) but also a bathroom shared between the owner and the second and third
floor tenants.
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the second respondent in the courts 41 would seem to indicate that this was
not a matter of dispute. Rather, the case proceeded on the basis of legal
42
argument on generally agreed facts.
In a footnote, Professor Hogg refers to the American cases on timelinesS4 3 but even the Supreme Court of the United States has acknowledged
that the exhaustion of domestic remedies is not a necessity in cases of obvious defects of jurisdiction and where the invocation of the administrative
process would be costly and wasteful.4
The jurisdiction concept is so much a part of judicial review of administrative action in Canada that it was really not open to the Supreme Court of
Canada to overturn it in Bell. Even accepting that Anisminic and Metropolitan Life take jurisdictional error too far, the same kind of criticism cannot really be made of Bell where the issue was clearly one coming within
the traditional notions of preliminary or collateral error. Because of the
nature of the error alleged and because of Board determination of this
question on other occasions the normally acceptable argument that Bell
should await preliminary Board determination does not carry the same weight,
and in the circumstances judicial intervention was not only appropriate but
also timely, even if ultimately incorrect on the merits of the statute's interpretation. Cure, if any, for excessive judicial intervention rests to a large
extent with legislatures rather than the courts. Moreover, such is the present
attitude of legislatures that intervention is encouraged rather than discouraged,
particularly in circumstances such as Bell where there is not even a standard
privative clause in the empowering statute. Given such a situation, it is somewhat unrealistic to expect the courts to temper legislative policy by the
exercise of adjudicative self-restraint.
41

Professor Hogg seems to argue (Supra, note 1 at 217) that the Supreme Court
was only represented with one side of the facts and was therefore not in a position
to make a proper determination of the factual matters involved.
42
This is implicit in the judgment of the Court delivered by Martland J. when he
stated:
In a case involving a conflict of evidence a court to which an application for prohibition was made might well decline to interfere (Supra, note 2 at 775 and 19
respectively.
43
Supra, note 1 at 220, note 61.
44
See e.g. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S.
456 (1943). Of particular appropriateness in the discussion of Bell is the United States
Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit decision in Wolff v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16,
372, F. 2d 817 (1967). This concerned an action by two students against their classification for military service by a Selective Service Board. In response to an argument
that the two students pursue their administrative or domestic remedies before seeking
relief in the courts, Medina, Circuit Judge held that because the classification of similar
students had been upheld by the final authority in the administrative hierarchy,
..... we are most reluctant in a case of this importance to require appellants to
proceed along the same futile path that others have trod before.
When there is nothing to be gained from the exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the harm from the continued existence of the administrative ruling
is great, the courts have not been reluctant to discard this doctrine. (at 825).

